Friday, July 30, 2010

Failing Nationalism Syndrome

Juan Cole: The Closing of the Zionist Mind

"Since the government of Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu is doing its best to run out the clock on a two-state solution, the only two plausible outcomes in Israel/Palestine in the coming decades are long years of dreary Apartheid or a one-state solution. It is not plausible that the Israelis will be allowed to keep the Palestinians stateless and without, ultimately, any real rights, forever. So Zionists (Israel nationalists) are increasingly suffering from Failing Nationalism Syndrome, and it is causing them to flail about saying the strangest things."

The Neocons have not been defeated, their ideas have been insitutionalized

Gareth Porter: Bomb Iran?

"The idea of waging a U.S. war of destruction against Iran is obvious lunacy, which is why U.S. military leaders have strongly resisted it both during the Bush and Obama administrations. But Gerecht makes it clear that Israel believes it can use its control of Congress to pound Obama into submission. Democrats in Congress, he boasts, “are mentally in a different galaxy than they were under President Bush.” Even though Israel has increasingly been regarded around the world as a rogue state after its Gaza atrocities and the commando killings of unarmed civilians on board the Mavi Marmara, its grip on the U.S. Congress appears as strong as ever.

Moreover, polling data for 2010 show that a majority of Americans have already been manipulated into supporting war against Iran – in large part because more than two-thirds of those polled have gotten the impression that Iran already has nuclear weapons. The Israelis are apparently hoping to exploit that advantage. “If the Israelis bomb now, American public opinion will probably be with them,” writes Gerecht. “Perhaps decisively so.” "


Anthony DiMaggio: Iran Under Siege

"As Haaretz reports, the former CIA chief, Michael Hayden, is also now warning that "military action against Iran now seems more likely because no matter what the U.S. does diplomatically, Tehran keeps pushing ahead with its suspected nuclear program." In his own words, Hayden explained that during the Bush years, "a strike was way down on the list of options," but now such an attack "seems inexorable....In my personal thinking, I have begun to consider that that [a military strike] may not be the worst of all possible outcomes." "

Conn Haliinan: The Great Myth of Counter-Insurgency

Conn Haliinan: The Great Myth of Counter-Insurgency

Thursday, July 29, 2010

The Marijuana Mode of Production

The Green Rush is On!

The Great Marijuana Boom

By BRUCE McEWEN

"Pot growers and their legions of strictly legal support staffs with their truck loads of irrigation hose, fertilizers, timers, netting, and everything else a remote pot enter prise might need, depart daily from Mendocino County's thriving garden supply businesses, head off to the hills. Many of these supply trucks drive east to Covelo and points north to irrigate marijuana out of the Middle Fork Eel River, the only reliable source of water in the summer time in the Mendocino National Forest."


M. Shadid Alam on Zionism

Running Out of Solutions

Israel: a Failing Colonial Project?

By M. SHAHID ALAM


"Perhaps, the best chance of unwinding the Zionist colonial project lies with the Jews themselves. Only when liberal segments of the Jewish diaspora are convinced that Zionism endangers Jewish lives, only when they act to countervail the power of the Jewish lobby in leading Western societies, will Israel finally be moved to dismantled its apartheid regime. In the end, the alternative to this orderly dismantling of Zionism is a destructive war in the Middle East that may not be limited to the region. Whatever else happens, it is unlikely that Israel or US interests in the Middle East will survive such a war."

Bacevich, The End of Military History

The End of (Military) History?
The United States, Israel, and the Failure of the Western Way of War
By Andrew J. Bacevich

" “In watching the flow of events over the past decade or so, it is hard to avoid the feeling that something very fundamental has happened in world history.” This sentiment, introducing the essay that made Francis Fukuyama a household name, commands renewed attention today, albeit from a different perspective.

Developments during the 1980s, above all the winding down of the Cold War, had convinced Fukuyama that the “end of history” was at hand. “The triumph of the West, of the Western idea,” he wrote in 1989, “is evident… in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.”

Today the West no longer looks quite so triumphant. Yet events during the first decade of the present century have delivered history to another endpoint of sorts. Although Western liberalism may retain considerable appeal, the Western way of war has run its course."

Monday, July 26, 2010

Iraqis, by and large, were better off under Saddam

John McCain: "We Already Won That One"

by: Marjorie Cohn, t r u t h o u t | News Analysis

"Most Iraqis have less than six hours of electricity per day. Baghdad's poorer neighborhoods have as little as one hour per day, leaving them without so much as an electric fan to withstand the blistering heat - 120 degrees in some places. The electricity shortages caused thousands of Iraqis to join street demonstrations in Baghdad last month.

The political situation in Iraq is worse than it was before the US invaded. Although Saddam Hussein was a tyrant, he nevertheless raised the Iraqi standard of living to a respectable level. "Saddam [had] improved the school system in Iraq and literacy for women was phenomenal for that of an Arab country at the time," William Quandt, a professor of Middle East politics at the University of Virginia, who has served as an adviser to the American government on Mideast policy, said on the PBS "News Hour." "People didn't go hungry in those days in Iraq," Quandt added."

Friday, July 23, 2010

Tax Rates as a Frontline in a Class War

Shut Up, Tea Partiers, We're On the Same Side ... Sort Of:

90 Percent of Us Should Pay No Taxes

By PAUL BUCCHEIT
April 23 - 25, 2010

"And the tax issue, dear Tea Partiers, is where we should be on the same side. No taxes, at least for 90% of us. But we keep bickering, and the country's super-yacht owners keep smiling. They are our common enemy. The wealthiest 1% of Americans, who have been the beneficiaries of the largest redistribution of income since the Great Depression, want the poorest 90% of us to believe that ANY tax will hurt EVERYONE.... Twenty-five years of shrewd financial strategies, government deregulation, and tax cuts have allowed the richest 1% to TRIPLE their incomes, AFTER TAXES, while the bottom 90% has seen their share drop over 20%. According to IRS figures, the richest 1% took in about 6.5% of America's total income in 1980. In 2006 it was about 19.5%. That's a TRILLION dollars a year, one-seventh of America's total income."

See also:

Taxing the Rich Wins in Oregon: Beating the Corporations

By SHAMUS COOKE

Thursday, July 22, 2010

The Deep State

Brad Simpson posts to the H-Diplo list (July 22, 2010):

"I would just like to open a discussion thread on the important new Washington Post series by Dana Priest and Bill Arkin on "Top Secret America." ...

How do we as historians even get an analytical handle on this phenomenon, when the vast majority of 'evidence' needed to understand and analyze it will never be declassified? We are talking about a vast and growing National Security State that few can even begin to grasp, which has incredibly important (and in my view deeply
disturbing and anti-democratic) implications. Its hard enough to try and write about discrete CIA operations for which job files are still secret, something else entirely to account for and describe a "top secret america" larger than the entire executive branch was during the early Cold War. What sort of methodological tools are going to be appropriate here? ...

To the extent people accept the existence (even as a form of short-hand) of a "military-industrial complex" - to which some might add Congress, the mass media of other institutions, is it appropriate to speak of a separate "national security-industrial complex" or National Security State that is analytically distinct? Is this merely the evolution of the DIA-CIA-NSA nexus of the early Cold War or something qualitatively new? Perhaps as important, how do we start teaching this?

...

The second of these articles, on private contractors, reinforces a profound shift that others have noted over the last 10-20 years towards the increasing privatization of core state functions and, increasingly, core national security functions. It seems we need to be thinking much more seriously about what sorts of theories of business-state-society relations might be useful for apprehending this phenomenon. Is this virtual fusing of the public and private sector a sort of 'national security corporatism'? Organized labor is, of course, nearly absent from this equation, but is corporatism as Michael Hogan, David Painter and others have utilized it of any theoretical value? If not, what sorts of theory might be useful? Of what use are the theoretical or descriptive models most of us use to describe decision-making, democratic accountability, the relationship between 'the branches of government,' etc. in dealing with these phenomena?"

Hedges and Jensen on the role of violence in anti-capitalist sruggle

Chris Hedges and Derrick Jensen on Totalitarianism and Resistance

"What is it going to take for concerned and engaged citizens to finally feel as though some crucial threshold has been crossed—that our nation’s political system and the global corporate culture it both serves and feeds into will never represent them or serve their needs? Continuing along that line, what’s to be done once that realization has hit home, as it has for authors Chris Hedges and Derrick Jensen? Both Hedges and Jensen offer their ideas in this July 5 interview with Mount Royal University professor Michael Truscello."

Marijuana: Water Inputs

Will Legalized Marijuana Keep California in the Green?

by: Sam Kornell | Miller-McCune

"A pound of pot requires, at the outermost limit, 250 gallons to grow, which means that a large serving of it requires about a half pint of water. By contrast, an orange takes 13 gallons water, a glass of wine 32 gallons, and a hamburger 600 gallons."

Tuesday, July 20, 2010

Gilman and Simpson on Ekbladh, The Great American Mission

H-Diplo Roundtable Review: David Ekbladh. The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Volume XI, No. 35 (2010)


Nils Gilman:
"[T]he argument that all (or even most) postwar development programs were modeled after the TVA, to my mind, is simply unsustainable. It is one thing to argue that the roots of postwar “high modernist” developmentalism can be traced to various specific pre-war “developmental” practices, including the TVA; it is altogether another to suggest that these practices, as well as the ideas underpinning them, did not undergo radical changes during the postwar period.
...
[The] typical colonial vision of development as “an archipelago of schemes” was in the postwar, post-colonial period replaced by an integrated and monolithic vision of “development” as a singular process destined to unify and integrate a world of liberal welfare-capitalist nation-states. In contrast to the fragmentary view of development in the prewar period, the postwar period’s vision of development was integrationist and committed to the notion that “all good things go together” – implicitly, if not explicitly. ...

In his effort to broaden his cast of characters, moreover, Ekbladh’s The Great American Mission ends up undervaluing the role of the postwar modernization theorists, which was to systematize – in other words, to theorize – how the particular practices of the interwar period could be brought together into an intellectually coherent whole. Moreover, the desire to create (and receptivity toward) such a grand unified theory of liberal development is incomprehensible outside the Cold War frame. The challenge to global liberalism posed by an integrated and ideologically committed Communist developmental alternative demanded an equally integrated and committed vision of liberal developmentalism. The postwar discourse of modernization, in contrast to prewar developmental discourse, was explicitly designed by its authors [...] to serve this integrating function. Modernization theory, in other words, framed development in terms of a metahistorical theory that could serve as a tool in the Cold War struggle. This social theory of modernization reached a crescendo around 1959, and thereafter began almost immediately to decay, as some modernization theorists went into government and began to promote the military as a vehicle for modernization – something that seems awfully hard to square with the idea that there existed some unbroken commitment to “the TVA creed.”

The claim of an abiding liberal consensus on modernization might just work if it is limited to talking about the narrow group of policy intellectuals that gathered around MIT, Harvard, Yale, and the University of Chicago in the 1950s, and can perhaps even be extended to the Kennedy and Johnson White Houses in the 1960s. But the broadening of The Great American Mission’s scope to include NGOs, business people, international institutions, and military officials should, in my opinion, have led to precisely the opposite conclusion, namely that there was NO broad consensus on what to do about development. When policy intellectuals and policymakers claimed there existed such a consensus, what these statements really entailed were efforts to sideline objections to their vision. In other words, these pronouncements of consensus were not factual descriptions of reality, but rather normative claims – bids for paradigm consolidation in the case of the social scientists, and bids for hegemony on the part of the politicians. In the end, what made it impossible to uphold the fiction that there existed any such consensus on development were the calamities in the field during the 1960s – from the misbegotten Alliance for Progress in Latin America, to famines in Africa and South Asia, to the political, military and moral disaster in Vietnam."


Brad Simpson:
"[B]y conflating virtually all twentieth century developmental projects, ideas and organizations with modernization Ekbladh obscures the intellectual and policy significance of modernization as a peculiarly Cold War project. And by reifying a ‘liberal consensus’ on development that never really existed he overemphasizes the dominance and continuity of a particular scheme – the TVA-style plan – vis-à-vis other noncommunist visions and programs of modernization, their myriad manifestations abroad and concurrent critiques.

...

Part of the problem here is that the decline of modernization theory cum policy was uneven, and critiques laid out in best-selling books and popular analyses moved at different speeds compared to the academy, much less the bureaucracies and practices of states and multilateral institutions. Even as proliferating international institutions and NGOs reframed the goals of development around poverty reduction and sustainability, modernization discourses persisted in the Nixon and Ford Administrations. The World Bank, for its part, hardly abandoned large-scale, state-led development projects carried out in the name of modernization, despite much argument to the contrary. The early 1970s represented the high tide of its commitment to state-guided population control and green revolution programs, and through the 1980s the Bank funded the largest transmigration program in history in Indonesia, led by the military modernizing regime of Suharto. Indonesia was no outlier – but the site of the Bank’s first and largest country mission, one of the largest recipients of Bank loans and a crucial source of legitimacy for the Bank’s increasingly central role in international development.
...

Though most academics writing about development and the development community more generally had long rejected modernization discourses, some of its core ideas refused to die, ready to be dusted off and hauled back into service after September 11, 2001. As if by intellectual gag reflex, policymakers and popular commentators revived core assumptions of modernization theory as an intellectual framework for apprehending places like Iraq and especially Afghanistan, with militant Islamic revivalism standing in for the basket of cultural atavisms that animated the literature in the 1950s and 1960s.

The “first time as tragedy, second time as farce” quality of U.S. ‘nation-building’ efforts in both countries would be comical if not for their often ghastly human impact. But the TVA seems to have faded as a pivot point of discussion about development in either place. Perhaps the crumbling of America’s infrastructure and the epic failure of Hurricane Katrina has tempered U.S. hubris about exporting its developmental technology elsewhere. In any case the name of the game in Washington now is counterinsurgency (COIN), embraced on both left and right – as in the early 1960s - as the indispensible partner of development, with both carried out as a public-private partnership dominated by the Pentagon and its gushing spigot of militarized aid
dollars."

Monday, July 19, 2010

Iraqi Oil Links

Some memorable stories on oil and the Iraq war:

Robert Dreyfuss, "The Thirty-Year Itch"
March/ April 2003

Daniel Yergin, “Gulf oil -- How important is it, anyway?,” San Francisco Chronicle, Sunday, 13 April 2003.

"Debunking Mainstream Media's Lies about Oil"
FTW's Dale Allen Pfeiffer Goes Head to Head With Pulitzer Prize Winner Daniel Yergin

"Why Did We Invade Iraq Anyway? Putting a Country in Your Tank"
By Michael Schwartz, October 30, 2007

"The Iraqi Oil Conundrum: Energy and Power in the Middle East"
By Michael Schwartz, Feb 2, 2010

"The Struggle over Iraqi Oil: Eyes Eternally on the Prize"
By Michael Schwartz, May 6, 2007.

"Colonizing Iraq: The Obama Doctrine?"
By Michael Schwartz, July 9, 2009

Turse on "Restrepo"

Death on Your Doorstep: What Sebastian Junger and Restrepo Won’t Tell You About War
By Nick Turse

"Few Americans born after the Civil War know much about war. Real war. War that seeks you out. War that arrives on your doorstep -- not once in a blue moon, but once a month or a week or a day. The ever-present fear that just when you’re at the furthest point in your fields, just when you’re most exposed, most alone, most vulnerable, it will come roaring into your world.

Those Americans who have gone to war since the 1870s -- soldiers or civilians -- have been mostly combat tourists, even those who spent many tours under arms or with pen (or computer) in hand reporting from war zones. The troops among them, even the draftees or not-so-volunteers of past wars, always had a choice -- be it fleeing the country or going to prison. They never had to contemplate living out a significant part of their life in a basement bomb shelter or worry about scrambling out of it before a foreign soldier tossed in a grenade. They never had to go through the daily dance with doom, the sense of fear and powerlessness that comes when foreign troops and foreign technology hold the power of life and death over your village, your home, each and every day."

Democracy Now! on WP's "Top Secret America"

"Top Secret America" _Washington Post_ Investigation Reveals Massive, Unmanageable, Outsourced US Intelligence System

"WILLIAM ARKIN: Well, really, the most significant thing that we found, Amy, is not that the intelligence agency or the vast homeland security apparatus does work in this field and that is—and that they are engaged in counterterrorism. Really the most significant finding, to me, is the number of private companies in America who have been enlisted in the war on terrorism and who have now become an intrinsic part of government, really where the line is blurred between government and private sector. And the fact that there are almost 2,000 companies that do top-secret work in—for the intelligence community and the military is not only surprising to me as someone who actually put together the data, but it really asks some fundamental questions about the nature of government and the nature of accountability. "

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Recent articles from Hirschkind, Cockburn, and Gordon

Charles Hirschkind: "The Myth of Impasse"

"When political analysts of the region have insisted on the importance of stepping back from the tit for tat of daily events in order to bring into the discussion this broader, more historical view, defenders of Israeli expansionist policies have usually responded in two ways. First, they have argued that the Palestinians themselves, by their refusal to accept the existence of Israel and give up violence, are to blame for whatever dispossession of lands they have suffered. By sabotaging each opportunity for peace put on the table by Israel, they argue, Palestinians bear the responsibility for their ever shrinking homeland. The claim that the victims of territorial expropriation deserve their plight due to their own treachery and aggression has a long historical pedigree. The dispossession of Native American lands by white colonists, for example, was justified on many occasions as an unavoidable consequence of the Natives’ refusal to remain within the generous territorial divisions allotted them, and by their continual recourse to violence and acts of terror against peaceful colonists. Today, from the vantage point of history, such claims appear only as window-dressing for brazen territorial conquest, and it is hard to think of any example where, with the hindsight of historical distance, we would not be led to a similar conclusion."

Patrick Cockburn: No Woodshed for Netanyahu

"Before yesterday's White House encounter there were particularly loud criticisms of Israel from the US security establishment. The influential commentator Dr Anthony Cordesman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies said that America's commitment to Israel's security "does not justify or excuse actions by an Israeli government that unnecessarily makes Israel a strategic liability when it should remain an asset".

Dr Cordesman said that Israel should be more careful about the extent to which it tests the limits of US patience and exploits the support of American Jews. He warned Israel against launching an attack on Iran in the face of a US "red light".

The US is particularly sensitive to the negative fallout of Israeli actions in the Middle East because America's strength in the region has been reduced by the failure of its military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq to achieve their objectives. On top of this Israel itself is getting politically and militarily weaker. The high point of Israel's influence in the Middle East was after the peace agreement with Egypt in 1979 which freed it to invade Lebanon in 1982. But intervention in Lebanon turned into a prolonged guerrilla war ending with Israel's final withdrawal in 2000. Military operations in Lebanon and Gaza in the following 10 years have uniformly failed to achieve their objectives. Meanwhile the head of Mossad, Meir Dagan, said that America's need for Israel is less since the end of the Cold War."

NEVE GORDON: "BOYCOTTING ISRAEL"

"BDS is also not about a particular solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but rather the demand that Israel abide by international law and UN resolutions. It is accordingly something that you can support if you are for a two state solution or a one state solution. You can even support it as a Zionist. It arises from the realization, following years of experience, that the Occupation will not end unless Israelis understand that it has a price."

Friday, July 16, 2010

Reviews of Cumings' Dominion

Bruce Cumings. Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. 672 pp.

H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews, Vol. XI, No. 34 (2010)

Jerald A. Combs, SFSU:

"Cumings argues that American history and foreign policy have been dominated by a Western outlook since Washington’s Farewell Address. He dismisses the Atlanticist outlook as one held by a tiny elite and which predominated only in the period between 1941 and the end of the Cold War. Instead of looking across the Atlantic for allies and models, even most Easterners in the period prior to 1941 hated England, despised European mores, and concentrated on continental expansion and internal markets."



Emily S. Rosenberg, University of California, Irvine:

"Although other scholars have described America’s Janus-faced foreign policy, in which a estern-looking tradition of nationalism, expansion, and unilateralism faces off against the tradition of Atlanticism and internationalism, never before has such an interpretation been so solidly anchored in a deep investigation of the West’s evolving political economy, culture, and involvement with the Pacific. Cuming’s states that the “central problem of the book is how to understand and explain the difference between an Atlantic-facing internationalism and a Pacific-facing expansionism.” One, of course, dealt with Europeans; the other largely with people of color.

...

California’s story is one of gold, Indian extermination, and railroad barons. Texas history is organized around cotton, cattle, oil, and the cowboy mythology. In offering the figure of the loner and the satisfactions of retributive violence, the oil and cowboy cultures of Texas fused together into an ethos that spread through the nation and even the world. For the Pacific and the Caribbean, Cumings lays out the story of colonial acquisition, the “dirty war” in the Philippines that transplanted the fierce traditions of frontier Indian-fighting to overseas imperial possessions, and the triumphalism of the Great White Fleet."

Ander Stepahson, Columbia:

"Pacificism Writ Large, or, Schumpeter in California"

"There are really two related arguments, or two arguments unfolding on different levels that intersect in a single event. There is, first, an argument about expansion and periodization. For a century and a half, the U.S. develops westwards, fairly easily, quite powerfully, facing away from Europe, secure and isolationist (in a manner of speaking). World War II changes all that, turning the U.S. into a predominantly Atlanticist power and for the duration of the cold war as conventionally understood (that is, until 1989-91), so it remains. Another name for Atlanticism would be ‘internationalism.’ The collapse of the Soviet Union then brings into view a kind of generalized (or ‘globalized’) version of that Atlanticist form of hegemonic rule in the 1990s, which is at once the dialectical end of Atlanticism and the preservation of it at some higher level (I am simplifying and rewriting a bit).

Unexpectedly, very unexpectedly for Cumings himself (and me too), this was cut short by a particularly atavistic return in 2001 to some pre-1941 form of unilateralism in the figure of George W. Bush and his cohort...


The second line of argument has to do with that great transformation and its axial event. Government (or the state) had always been involved in development. Witness the gigantic subsidies to the railroads, in turn the constitutive factor in the process. Witness also the intimate connection between state and often individual business on the crucial problem of providing water to essentially arid southern California, a feature amplified by the New Deal and creating a spectacular kind of hydraulic state at the opposite political end of what such a state notoriously was supposed to be. World War II, however, marks a decisive, qualitative shift. Massive infusions of funds serve to industrialize across the board, to connect the west organically to the rest of the nation, while actually also catapulting to the cutting edge of capitalism at home and abroad. Unrepeatable historical and geographic circumstances in combination with federal intervention opened up for a monumental expansion of innovation and entrepreneurship, two already existing features in the region that, in combination with extraordinary natural resources and agricultural prowess, made the west (i.e. California) peerless in capitalist development. California (and the rest, though less so) benefitted enormously from having been created ex nihilo as it were, from being a late developer in world capitalist terms and from having no existing structures to contend with, only abundant resources and incomparable weather, the totality now fueled by cheap water and cheap electricity, not to mention local oil. Paradoxically, this moment also provides the ground for the emergence of rightwing Republicanism, the kind of politics that lives on denigration of taxes, Washington and the government whilst benefiting tremendously from these very institutions, above all in the form of defense expenditure. The combination of forces and the conjuncture following first 7 December 1941, then the advent of the cold war in 1947, and then, finally and irrevocably, the outbreak of the Korean War (in a way) in June 1950, all produced an exceptional space for capitalist development. This, then, is the outside project deployed to rev up what is already there, creating the full-fledged Pacific city on the hill.

...

Schumpeter’s own limits have to do with class and there is indeed nothing much about class in Cumings. This is partly because we are in some Hartzian universe where the bourgeoisie is everywhere and therefore nowhere: California exceptionalism if you will, ‘the clean slate,’ but the main reason is precisely that Cumings is following Schumpeter. The Austrian was preoccupied with the productive disequilibria of creative destruction, innovation and entrepreneurship, with talent and its conditions of possibility. Here he always recognized his deep debt to Marx (and Cumings carefully notes their affinities), above all on the subject of creative destruction, the constant revolutionizing of the means of production. Schumpeter, however, was not concerned with labour and exploitation. Class entered into the account early on as the bourgeois failure to displace the outmoded aristocracy in Central Europe and later, conversely, in the bourgeois failure to find some counterpoint to aristocratic purpose.2 California, as Cumings celebrates it, is presumably a Schumpeterian success in that regard: it never has to face the bourgeois impasse because the rivers of talent never dry up. I merely note this feature in Cumings. All I want to do is render it explicit so we can think systemically about his way of thinking systemically.

...

Cumings’s sizeable intervention had to do with Schurmann’s shortcoming on, inter alia, the issue of state, class and ideology, not to mention his reliance on Schumpeter (“Schurmann hurts his own analysis most when he is consciously being Schumpeterian and anti-Marxian.” 60).

Cumings thinks, by contrast, that consensus rather than conflict is the mark of the U.S. in the cold war, though he also retains Schurmann’s distinction. Evidently, then, there is an interesting essay to be written on Cumings, Schumpeter and Schurmann. Here I will only cite one of Cumings’s remarks which is relevant for his present Conclusion: “Accommodation is a sophisticated strategy that usually draws the fire of narrowminded conservatives who mistake its intent. Yet it is a truly conservative policy for defusing conflict, predicated on maintaining the existing arrangements” (62)."


American Militarism

Recent Stories on American Militarism

What Eisenhower Could Teach Obama, Part I, Melvin Goodman

"No president since Eisenhower has fully understood the Pentagon’s dominant position in military and security policy. Armed with his knowledge and experience as World War II’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Eisenhower made sure that he could not be outmaneuvered by his military advisers, particularly on such key issues as the Vietnam War and tensions with the Soviet Union."
William Astore, Hope and Change Fade, but War Endures
"By eliminating the draft and relying ever more on for-profit private military contractors, we've made war a distant abstractionfor most Americans, who can choose to consume it as spectacle or simply tune it out as so much background noise."

Losing in Afghanistan | CommonDreams.org

"Noting that CIA director Leon Panetta admitted that the number of Al Qaeda left in Afghanistan may be 50 to 100, Zakaria asked, “why are we fighting a major war” there? “Last month alone there were more than 100 NATO troops killed in Afghanistan,” he said. “That’s more than one allied death for each living Al Qaeda member in the country in just one month.”

Our economic crisis is directly tied to the cost of the war. We are in desperate need of money for education and health care. The $1 million per year it costs to maintain a single soldier in Afghanistan could pay for 20 green jobs."

Alexander Cockburn: The Fall of Obama

Alexander Cockburn: The Fall of Obama

"It is not Obama’s fault that across 30 years more and more money has floated up to the apex of the social pyramid till America is heading back to where it was in the 1880s, a nation of tramps and millionaires....

But it is Obama’s fault that he did not understand this, that always, from the getgo, he flattered Americans with paeans to their greatness, without adequate warning of the political and corporate corruption destroying America and the resistance he would face if he really fought against the prevailing arrangements that were destroying America. He offered them a free and easy pass to a better future, and now they see that the promise was empty.

It’s Obama’s fault, too, that, as a communicator, he cannot rally and inspire the nation from its fears. From his earliest years he has schooled himself not to be excitable, not to be an angry black man who would be alarming to his white friends at Harvard and his later corporate patrons. Self-control was his passport to the guardians of the system, who were desperate to find a symbolic leader to restore America’s credibility in the world after the disasters of the Bush era. He is too cool....

Obama had his window of opportunity last year, when he could have made jobs and financial reform his prime objectives. That’s what Americans hoped for. Mesmerized by economic advisers who were creatures of the banks, he instead plunged into the Sargasso Sea of “health reform,” wasted the better part of a year, and ended up with something that pleases no one."

Wednesday, July 14, 2010

Stephanson on Gaddis

ANDERS STEPHANSON: "SIMPLICISSIMUS"

New Left Review 49, January-February 2008


Anders Stephanson on John Lewis Gaddis, Cold War and Surprise, Security and the American Experience. Diplomatic history as mirror for presidents, with postwar geopolitics recast as morality tale.


"John Lewis Gaddis has been one of the most ideological figures within the subfield of us ‘diplomatic history’. All historians, of course, operate in and through ideology; Gaddis, however, has been unusual in foregrounding the ideological nature of his works. Though the message to be conveyed has not always been the same, he has been constant in his defence of us interests, and has consistently mirrored—albeit with slight lags—the prevailing attitudes of the powers that be. A realist in the 1970s and neo-Reaganite from the late 1980s onwards, Gaddis was somewhat disgruntled in the Clinton era, but has found the second Bush altogether more congenial. Gaddis’s method, too, has endured across his extensive œuvre: always disdainful of any excessive fascination with the archives, he has preferred to pick out some theme or idea and drive it through with relentless single-mindedness and clarity, subordinating every aspect of the proceedings to his ideological aim. His characterization of Ronald Reagan in his most recent book, The Cold War, applies equally to himself: ‘His strength lay in his ability to see beyond complexity to simplicity’.

...

There remains the insurmountable problem called the People’s Republic of China. Where does it fit in Gaddis’s scheme? How could the United States virtually ally itself with the most radical of Communist regimes, which was not even diplomatically recognized, against a far more conservative one, officially committed to the idea of peaceful coexistence? On these issues, Gaddis offers nothing but cursory remarks, murmuring vaguely that the consensus on China is still unclear—as though any such consensual clarity would have mattered to him. This reticence stems from a certain ambiguity on the foundational question of whether the Cold War was a systemic conflict. If a utopian communist such as Mao could decide, on ‘realistic’ grounds, to ally with the us, and if the us could ally with him in the name of triangulation, what systemic dimension could there possibly be?

...

Moreover, pre-emption, unilateralism and hegemony cannot be said to form a specifically ‘American’ trinity as Gaddis contends. Indeed, there is arguably no trinity at all: what makes the former two effective is, in the end, hegemony. Without this normative ingredient, pre-emption and unilateralism would become simple tools of classical statecraft, or, put differently, the military house rules of the state of Israel. This, not the redoubtable John Quincy Adams, seems the immediate model."

The X File: A. Stephanson on George Kennan

"The X-File"


"Born in 1904 during Teddy Roosevelt's first Administration, and dead on March 24, 2005, under a very different kind of Republican rule, George Kennan took his last stance as a public intellectual when he was about to turn 100. The issue was the impending invasion of Iraq. Kennan considered it ill advised. The official justifications for war struck him as flimsy, the servile reaction by the leadership of the Democratic Party "shabby and shameful." When Colin Powell traveled up to Princeton later to pay homage on Kennan's hundredth birthday, the Secretary, though doubtless aware of these views, nevertheless saw fit to liken the Iraqi operation to containment.

...

he decisive aspect of these two texts (whose internal contradictions and errors I leave aside) was precisely Kennan's prescriptive refusal to deploy the traditional means of diplomacy in relations with Moscow, his insistence that nothing serious could be achieved by way of negotiation on fundamental issues of mutual concern until the entire nature of the regime had changed. I take this to be the decisive aspect of the cold war as well, the aspect of warlike hostility under formal conditions of peace that made the conflict a cold war as opposed to a nasty but essentially traditional conflict of international relations. In my view, this posture fundamentally shaped US foreign policy until the early 1960s, when the Cuban missile crisis, the Sino-Soviet split and other factors rendered it largely obsolete. Kennan's responsibility for the cold war, it would seem, was thus far from negligible. Perhaps Powell had a point?

...

That Kennan did not invoke the appeasement analogy perhaps owed something to the fact that he had had strong affinities for appeasement in the late 1930s. The chief reason, however, was that, as a conservative of the communitarian and sometimes authoritarian kind, he was suspicious of generalities, particularly historical analogies featuring "abstractions." He preferred particularities, or what he called "realities." Stalin was real. The apparatus he controlled at home and abroad was real. Communism, by contrast, was something else. Kennan was thus never a conventional anticommunist. He was against communism and fought communists, sometimes with means he would later regret. He certainly thought, at least for a while, that the Stalinist dictatorship should be fought fiercely in every conceivable way but open war. But he had no sympathy for the idea that the United States was engaged in a universal struggle against a singular, monolithic enemy called communism.

...

As was stated implicitly in NSC 68--the powerful 1950 summa of cold war thinking in the Truman Administration--and explicitly by containment's Republican critics, this strategy seemed to mean an unacceptably long moment of waiting for Godot while letting the evil forces roam pretty much freely within their confines. Hence the clamor in the early 1950s for "rollback," a supposedly active policy of muscular confrontation. In practice, however, Republicans and Democrats alike followed Kennan's erstwhile precept. The fundamental reason was simple. Containment may have been based on faulty premises, but as it was appropriated into a universal division of good and evil, its "positive" side--the prophylactic building of a global, anticommunist system led by the United States in the name of "the free world"--turned out to be immeasurably more important than the "negative" need to destroy Moscow in the name of rollback.

The project of eradicating evil turned out to be more important than actually achieving it. Indeed, it was precisely because it was wrong that containment worked so beautifully as cold war policy, the essence of which was to render unshakable the US commitment to globalism. Containment, meanwhile, did not destroy the Soviet Union but rather maintained it. Kennan's actual policy of mutual withdrawal from central Europe (a notion initially borrowed from Walter Lippmann) would have changed the Soviet Union long before that change came to pass.

Throughout the 1950s, Kennan derided the "triumphant and excited and self- righteous anti-communism" and the "image of the totally inhuman and totally malevolent adversary." By the end of the decade, his concrete policy positions (on Germany, nuclear weapons, recognition of interests) seemed closer to Moscow's than to those of his own government. Ultimately, despite an emphatic sense of citizenship, his allegiances were civilizational rather than national, to "the West" rather than to the United States. And by this time he had begun to see the Soviet Union as part of the "conservative-authoritarian" tradition he thought had been "the norm" in the West during the Christian era, not at any rate a state "hideous in the sight of God." Nationalism was by contrast one of his civilizational targets. He despised Wilsonian notions of self-determination along with the related principle of national sovereignty. "Could anything be more absurd," he asked, "than a world divided into several dozens of large secular societies, each devoted to the cultivation of the myth of its own unlimited independence?" The "world," at any rate, was not the site of an all-encompassing struggle between the free world and communism. It was precisely such mistaken cold war notions, Kennan thought, that were turning the world into a potential burial ground"

Stephanson on Hegel and Haiti

THE PHILOSOPHER’S ISLAND

Anders Stephanson

New Left Review 61, January-February 2010


"Lots of people have of course thought about the Haitian Revolution, as well as slavery, in Hegelian terms. It has been hard, indeed, to think of slavery in any other way, as it has been hard to think of identity and difference outside of that dialectic, certainly until Gilles Deleuze’s frontal assault on the dialectic itself in the name of (Nietzschean) frontal assault. In the Caribbean context, specifically the Francophone one, there is a distinguished lineage of engagement with Hegel going back at least to Aimé Césaire in the early 1940s. We are always already in Hegel, as the staunchly anti-Hegelian Michel Foucault once implied. What’s new in Buck-Morss’s account, then, is not that one might profitably read the Haitian master–slave relationship in Hegelian terms but that Hegel himself read that relation in Haitian terms, in his first great publication, the Phenomenology of Spirit (or Mind if you prefer) in 1807.

...

The empirical argument is set up by means of a gloss on David Brion Davis’s epochal work from the 1960s and 70s: the massive conceptual presence of ‘slavery’ in the Enlightenment, as the antithesis of ‘freedom’ on the part of the properly autonomous, free-willing Self, is contrasted with the astonishing lack of interest in actually existing slavery; a supreme case of ideological misrecognition, so to speak, which fails egregiously to see that the institution of slavery was integral to the whole operation of ‘Europe’, that indeed it was an economic condition of possibility for the very emergence of the enlightened bourgeoisie itself. In the French Revolution this paradox (is it a paradox?) came to its sharpest possible expression, courtesy of the slave revolt in Saint-Domingue that broke out in August 1791. Saint-Domingue, on the eve of the Revolution in 1789, was less the jewel in the crown than an enormous chunk of the bank accounts of the expansive French bourgeoisie. The island was the supreme envy of every rapacious maritime entrepreneur in Europe: by far the greatest money-machine in the colonial world. Five hundred thousand slaves, a majority born in Africa and imported at accelerating pace in the 1780s, produced half of all the sugar and coffee consumed in Europe and the Americas. Mercantilist policies ensured that the metropolitan French made enormous profits in the re-exporting business. Upwards of a million people in France probably depended for their wherewithal on the colony, but the trade was also strategic, the surpluses underwriting naval expansion. It made some sense for France to concede its Canadian possessions in the 1760s to secure Saint-Domingue and the smaller colonies in the Caribbean. It was this prized possession, then, that was lost after an exceedingly bloody war, or series of wars, beginning in 1791 and ending with the declaration of independence on 1 January 1804, when Saint-Domingue was renamed Haiti/Hayti in accordance with an ancient Amerindian designation."

Tuesday, July 13, 2010

Critical Reviews of Craig and Logevall 2009

Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall. America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.


H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews, Vol. XI, No. 33 (2010)

Review by Anders Stephanson, Columbia University
"In the Land of Neo-Gaddisia":
"One must resist the early temptation to see this work as warmed-over John Lewis Gaddis, the realist or para-realist Gaddis from 1972 to 1986 or thereabouts before he begins, a bit tongue in cheek, to write pure ideology about ideology. One must resist the temptation because Craig and Logevall give the Gaddisian idea of some golden moment of the judicious and prudent mean between 1947 and 1950 a certain critical twist that the model figure never really could quite bring himself to articulate."

...

"In the mid-1970s, meanwhile, no great power had suffered a decline, relatively speaking, as profound as the United States: prestige damaged, economy seemingly in tatters, position in the third world under siege, the kind of stuff of which neo-conservative dreams are made. This wrenching crisis of the 1970s actually marked the transformation of U.S. capitalism (as well as its global system) in a postmodern direction, which in turn set the stage for the highly contingent events of the 1980s."

...

"From what Archimedian point is one to define ‘the common good’? It is hard to tell. One reply, my own, would be to say that foreign policy should be subject to democratic control and that the problem is not ‘contamination’ by the public but the systemic manipulation and distortion to which it is typically subjected, in short, the absence of a genuinely democratic public sphere when it comes to foreign policy. The Craig and Logevall position, by contrast, really amounts to this: public interference with the identification of the public interest in the foreign relations of the United States is on the whole pernicious. They might counter this condensation either by saying that the ‘public’ is an imaginary construct, a Phantom Public, just as Walter Lippmann said in his famous polemic with John Dewey, or by arguing that it was precisely the manipulations and the distortions in the name of a rhetorically excessive anti-communism that led to the possibility of making political hay from all manner of crassly self-serving lies (an approach exemplified in particularly clear form by Richard Nixon in his early career).They could also counter by pointing (as they partly do) to the specific influence of lobbies. They could, in the last instance, point to the dysfunctional nature of the U.S. political system which invests the Executive with a remarkable license to act in matters of ‘national security’ while making it nigh-on impossible to enact anything fundamental in matters domestic. They could explore further Logevall’s Bernath argument about (in a way) national culture and the constraints on understanding identity and difference. What they chiefly do, however, is to complain about ‘politics’ and invoking the common good." (25)

"Decision-making as an object of inquiry is of course legitimate. It is hard to see how it could not be, given the manner in which decisions are indeed made in the United States and the enormous effect they sometimes have for the lives and wherewithal of people and peoples very far away. What the White House decides is of essential concern, as any Iraqi citizen will testify. However, decision-making as an enclosed sphere of inquiry threatens to land the historian in the territory of mirroring the prince (to use an ancient term and genre), writing court histories designed, if not to teach the prince directly how to do things then at least to inform the vast apparatus of organic intellectuals devoted to the princely office how one might go about the business more profitably."


From Craig and Logevall's rejoinder:

"Eisenhower in his Farewell Address showed that he understood what some later historians may not. He said that “only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry” can stop the military-industrial complex from endangering “our liberties or democratic processes.” Like Eisenhower, we favor more “public interference” in foreign policy making, not less, in order to wrest control over it from the militarists and alarmists (elected and unelected) who wielded immense power in the Washington of 1961–and who still do so today."

Netanyahu hears no discouraging words from Obama

Dana Milbank, WP

"On Pennsylvania Avenue outside the White House on Tuesday, liberal activists protested what many of them see as a betrayal. "We want to appeal to Obama to stand up for once, to get a little vertebrate in his invertebrate back and speak to Netanyahu in no uncertain terms," protester Ray McGovern shouted into a bullhorn. Obama, he added, is "a president who by all indications is what we call in the Bronx a 'wuss': a person who will not stand up for what he knows is right."

Even before Obama's surrender to Netanyahu, Muslims were losing faith that he would be the transformational figure who spoke to them from Cairo last year. A Pew Research Center poll last month found that the percentage of Muslims expressing confidence in Obama fell from 41 percent to 31 percent in Egypt and from 33 percent to 23 percent in Turkey"

Obama: 'I Have Met Israel and It Is "Us"'



“If you look at every public statement that I’ve made over the last year and a half, it has been a constant reaffirmation of the special relationship between the United States and Israel, that our commitment to Israel’s security has been unwavering. And in fact, there aren’t any concrete policies that you could point to that would contradict that.”

Friday, July 9, 2010

Obama and Israel

Norman Finkelstein: Results, Not Rhetoric

Laura Flanders, Grit TV:

"Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu discussing their countries' foreign relations resembles two lovers discussing their future together. Though they have squabbled in the past over trivial things (things like settlement expansion that most other countries deem flagrant violations of international law), their July 6th meeting at the White House showed that their "unbreakable bond" cannot be shaken. Norman Finkelstein joins us in the studio to report that one should judge the alleged "peace process" with results, not rhetoric. Obama has certainly given enough lip service to settlement moratoriums, proximity talks, and direct talks, but what are the results? Since the Oslo Accords in 1993, there are three times as many settlers and Israel has annexed 42% of Palestinian land for even more expansion. Though Obama waxes eloquently about "direct negotiations," there are no signs of Israel withdrawing to the 1967 borders that would only begin to indicate a successful peace process."

Lessons from Vietnam

The Pentagon Book Club



"In the spring of 1984, a young Army officer wrote a seminar paper about the use of force in the post-Vietnam era. Three years later he returned to the subject in a Princeton University doctoral dissertation titled "The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam." What "today's junior officers think about Vietnam—which is fast becoming ancient history—is likely to undergo significant change before they assume positions of power and influence," he claimed. In his dissertation, he sought to investigate the legacy of the war and its "chastening effect on military thinking about the use of force," which made military leaders, he contended, "more cautious than before." "Caution has its virtues, of course," he wrote. However, "the lessons from which that caution springs are not without flaws." Among the flawed lessons he identified were a professional aversion to counterinsurgency operations, "a new skepticism about the efficacy of American forces in the Third World countries where social, political, and economic factors are the causes of unrest" and "a widespread fear among officers that assignment to counterinsurgency, special forces type missions will be the end of their career."

The author of those words is David Petraeus, now a four-star general and commander of the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Petraeus graduated from West Point in 1974, one year before the fall of Saigon, and he has lately consolidated his military career around trying to reverse the lessons of Vietnam. "

Wednesday, July 7, 2010

The Political Economy of Israel's Occupation

The Political Economy of Israel's Occupation
An interview with Shir Hever (transcript)
Shir Hever is an economic researcher in the Alternative Information Center, a Palestinian-Israeli organization active in Jerusalem and Beit-Sahour. Researching the economic aspect of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, some of his research topics include international aid to the Palestinians and Israel, the effects of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories on the Israeli economy, and the boycott, divestment and sanctions campaigns against Israel. He is a frequent speaker on the topic of the economy of the Israeli occupation.

Coup-Proofing

Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequeces in the Middle East

By: James T. Quinlivan

RAND Reprint Originally published in: International Security, v. 24, no. 2, Fall 1999, pp. 131-165.

"A number of Middle Eastern states — e.g., Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia — seem to be "coup-proof." That is, their regimes have created structures that minimize the possibility that a small group can seize power. These include effectively exploiting family, ethnic, and religious loyalties; creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military; development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor one another; fostering of expertness in the regular military; and adequately financing such measures. The regime is thus able to create an army that is effectively larger than one drawn solely from trustworthy segments of the population."

Jews as Native Iraqis

Joel Beinin, "Jews as Native Iraqis: An Introduction," in Nessim Rejwan, The Last Jews of Baghdad: Remembering a Lost Homeland (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004).

The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems

"Ferguson argues that although elections do not simply go to the highest bidder, only access to money from investors makes a real campaign possible. Since representatives need money to get elected, they can’t take positions unpopular with moneyed interests, though those positions would win in the “perfectly informed voters” world of the median-voter theorem. Voters cannot overcome the transaction costs of pooling their resources, so they must accept the choices offered."

Thomas Ferguson, Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

Reviewed by Michael C. Munger, The Independent Review, 1:1 (1996).

Tuesday, July 6, 2010

Mandarins, Guns and Money: Academics and the Cold War

Liberal remorse sets in...

My Private Obama

by Robert Kuttner

"But even a dire economic crisis and a Republican blockade of needed remedies have not fundamentally altered the temperament, trajectory, or tactical instincts of this surprisingly aloof president. He has not been willing or able to use his office to move public opinion in a direction that favors more activism. Nor has Obama, for the most part, seized partisan and ideological opportunities that hapless Republicans and clueless corporate executives keep lobbing him like so many high, hanging curve balls."

Friday, July 2, 2010

Why McChrystal Did It, Immanuel Wallerstein

"McChrystal gave the interview in order that he be fired. And why did he want to be fired? He wanted to be fired because he knew that the policies he was pursuing and championing in the war in Afghanistan were not working, could not work. And he didn’t want to be the one tarnished with the public blame."