Wednesday, July 7, 2010

The Political Economy of Israel's Occupation

The Political Economy of Israel's Occupation
An interview with Shir Hever (transcript)
Shir Hever is an economic researcher in the Alternative Information Center, a Palestinian-Israeli organization active in Jerusalem and Beit-Sahour. Researching the economic aspect of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, some of his research topics include international aid to the Palestinians and Israel, the effects of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories on the Israeli economy, and the boycott, divestment and sanctions campaigns against Israel. He is a frequent speaker on the topic of the economy of the Israeli occupation.

Coup-Proofing

Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequeces in the Middle East

By: James T. Quinlivan

RAND Reprint Originally published in: International Security, v. 24, no. 2, Fall 1999, pp. 131-165.

"A number of Middle Eastern states — e.g., Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia — seem to be "coup-proof." That is, their regimes have created structures that minimize the possibility that a small group can seize power. These include effectively exploiting family, ethnic, and religious loyalties; creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military; development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor one another; fostering of expertness in the regular military; and adequately financing such measures. The regime is thus able to create an army that is effectively larger than one drawn solely from trustworthy segments of the population."

Jews as Native Iraqis

Joel Beinin, "Jews as Native Iraqis: An Introduction," in Nessim Rejwan, The Last Jews of Baghdad: Remembering a Lost Homeland (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004).

The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems

"Ferguson argues that although elections do not simply go to the highest bidder, only access to money from investors makes a real campaign possible. Since representatives need money to get elected, they can’t take positions unpopular with moneyed interests, though those positions would win in the “perfectly informed voters” world of the median-voter theorem. Voters cannot overcome the transaction costs of pooling their resources, so they must accept the choices offered."

Thomas Ferguson, Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

Reviewed by Michael C. Munger, The Independent Review, 1:1 (1996).

Tuesday, July 6, 2010

Mandarins, Guns and Money: Academics and the Cold War

Liberal remorse sets in...

My Private Obama

by Robert Kuttner

"But even a dire economic crisis and a Republican blockade of needed remedies have not fundamentally altered the temperament, trajectory, or tactical instincts of this surprisingly aloof president. He has not been willing or able to use his office to move public opinion in a direction that favors more activism. Nor has Obama, for the most part, seized partisan and ideological opportunities that hapless Republicans and clueless corporate executives keep lobbing him like so many high, hanging curve balls."

Friday, July 2, 2010

Why McChrystal Did It, Immanuel Wallerstein

"McChrystal gave the interview in order that he be fired. And why did he want to be fired? He wanted to be fired because he knew that the policies he was pursuing and championing in the war in Afghanistan were not working, could not work. And he didn’t want to be the one tarnished with the public blame."