Tuesday, August 31, 2010

Living in the End Times

Slavoj Žižek: Wake up and smell the apocalypse

Zizek with Liz Else

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20727751.100-slavoj-zizek-wake-up-and-smell-the-apocalypse.html?full=true

"For me, remember, apocalypse means revelation, not catastrophe. ...

I think that era of relativism, where science was just another product of knowledge, is ending. We philosophers should join scientists asking those big metaphysical questions about quantum physics, about reality."

Sunday, August 29, 2010

Andrew Bacevich: The Umaking of a Company Man

"The starting point of critical elaboration is te consciousness of what one really is, and id "knowing thyself" as a product of the historical process to date, which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without ever leaving you an inventory. Therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory."
- Antonio Gramsci quoted in Edward Said, Orientalism (1978): 25.

The Unmaking of a Company Man:
An Education Begun in the Shadow of the Brandenburg Gate


By Andrew Bacevich

http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175290/tomgram:_andrew_bacevich,_how_washington_rules__/

"By temperament and upbringing, I had always taken comfort in orthodoxy. In a life spent subject to authority, deference had become a deeply ingrained habit. I found assurance in conventional wisdom. Now, I started, however hesitantly, to suspect that orthodoxy might be a sham. I began to appreciate that authentic truth is never simple and that any version of truth handed down from on high -- whether by presidents, prime ministers, or archbishops -- is inherently suspect. The powerful, I came to see, reveal truth only to the extent that it suits them. Even then, the truths to which they testify come wrapped in a nearly invisible filament of dissembling, deception, and duplicity. The exercise of power necessarily involves manipulation and is antithetical to candor.

...

These visits to Jena and Berlin offered glimpses of a reality radically at odds with my most fundamental assumptions. Uninvited and unexpected, subversive forces had begun to infiltrate my consciousness. Bit by bit, my worldview started to crumble.

That worldview had derived from this conviction: that American power manifested a commitment to global leadership, and that both together expressed and affirmed the nation’s enduring devotion to its founding ideals. That American power, policies, and purpose were bound together in a neat, internally consistent package, each element drawing strength from and reinforcing the others, was something I took as a given. That, during my adult life, a penchant for interventionism had become a signature of U.S. policy did not -- to me, at least -- in any way contradict America’s aspirations for peace. Instead, a willingness to expend lives and treasure in distant places testified to the seriousness of those aspirations.

...

For me, the Cold War had played a crucial role in sustaining that worldview. ... [It] provided a framework that organized and made sense of contemporary history."

After retiring from the military Bacevich began to reflect on the nature and implications of American militarism:

"Wealth, power, and celebrity became not aspirations but subjects for critical analysis. History -- especially the familiar narrative of the Cold War -- no longer offered answers; instead, it posed perplexing riddles.

...

George W. Bush’s decision to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 pushed me fully into opposition. Claims that once seemed elementary -- above all, claims relating to the essentially benign purposes of American power -- now appeared preposterous. The contradictions that found an ostensibly peace-loving nation committing itself to a doctrine of preventive war became too great to ignore. The folly and hubris of the policy makers who heedlessly thrust the nation into an ill-defined and open-ended “global war on terror” without the foggiest notion of what victory would look like, how it would be won, and what it might cost approached standards hitherto achieved only by slightly mad German warlords. During the era of containment, the United States had at least maintained the pretense of a principled strategy; now, the last vestiges of principle gave way to fantasy and opportunism. With that, the worldview to which I had adhered as a young adult and carried into middle age dissolved completely.

Prior to World War II, Americans by and large viewed military power and institutions with skepticism, if not outright hostility. In the wake of World War II, that changed. An affinity for military might emerged as central to the American identity. ... A people who had long seen standing armies as a threat to liberty now came to believe that the preservation of liberty required them to lavish resources on the armed forces."

Monday, August 23, 2010

Obama: The Nowhere Man who Stands for Nothing

A pretty good breakdown of the Obama debacle - and the dangers of posed by the lack of a overall political philosophy in politics. The public does not want "pragmatic government that works" - as if history had ended and there was no longer any need for public debate concerning what constitutes "the good" in contemporary society - it wants an overall philosophy of the role of government in society and the economy. There is no consensus on these matters, only live arguments. Obama has never been willing to make an argument, which is why I have never supported him.

I'm on record from the earliest days of the Obama Presidency (here) stating that Obama's presidency would make that of Jimmy Carter look like a towering success. The Left made a major misstep in not making any demands of Obama. We gotten nothing from him, but a major backlash. If Obama would have felt some push back on FISA, campaign finance, Afghanistan, the public option, etc... he would have got the message that he was going to have to stand for something - which would have left him on more solid ground from which to engage the Right .

Dems Urge Obama to Take a Stand

by John F. Harris and James Hohmann

http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/08/23-0


"Obama's predicament: By declining to speak clearly and often about his larger philosophy - and insisting that his actions are guided not by ideology but a results-oriented "pragmatism" - he has bred confusion and disappointment among his allies, and left his agenda and motives vulnerable to distortion by his enemies.

The president's reluctance to be a Democratic version of Ronald Reagan, who spoke without apology about his vaulting ideological ambitions, has produced an odd turn of events: Obama has been the most activist domestic president in decades, but the philosophy behind his legislative achievements remains muddy in the eyes of many supporters and skeptics alike. There is not yet such a thing as "Obamism."

...

By some lights, however, he and his team became so enthralled with the idea of a personality-driven "Obama brand" that they neglected the need to explain - and, in a modern media environment, to explain and explain again - the ideas behind the personality."


Friday, August 20, 2010

TomDispatch: The Cult of COIN

A great title, but not much analysis of the actual content of counterinsurgency:

The Land Where Theories of Warfare Go to Die
Obama, Petraeus, and the Cult of COIN in Afghanistan

By Robert Dreyfuss

http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175266/tomgram%3A_robert_dreyfuss,_the_president_chooses_the_guru/

"On the other hand, Petraeus is not simply another McChrystal. While McChrystal implemented COIN doctrine, mixing in his obsession with “kinetic operations” by U.S. Special Forces, Petraeus literally wrote the book -- namely, The U.S Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.

If the COIN cult has a guru (whom all obey unquestioningly), it’s Petraeus. The aura that surrounds him, especially among the chattering classes of the Washington punditocracy, is palpable, and he has a vast well of support among Republicans and assorted right-wingers on Capitol Hill, including the Holy Trinity: John McCain, Lindsay Graham, and Joe Lieberman.

...

Still, it’s worrying. Petraeus’s COIN policy logically demands a decade-long war, involving labor-intensive (and military-centric) nation-building, waged village by village and valley by valley, at a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars and countless U.S., NATO, and Afghan casualties, including civilians. That idea doesn’t in the least square with the idea that significant numbers of troops will start leaving Afghanistan next summer. Indeed, Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer with long experience in the Middle East and South Asia, who headed Obama’s first Afghan policy review in February 2009, told me (for an article in Rolling Stone last month) that it’s not inconceivable the military will ask for even more troops, not agree to fewer, next year."

Standing on the 2nd Amendement

I've always thought that the 2nd Amendment (properly interpreted of course...) precluded and preemnts any need for a standing army... Someday, I'll elaborate. For now here is Andrew Bacevich on the dangers posed by a Standing National Army:

Endless war, a recipe for four-star arrogance
By Andrew J. Bacevich
Sunday, June 27, 2010; B01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/25/AR2010062502160_pf.html

"After Vietnam, the United States abandoned its citizen army tradition, oblivious to the consequences. In its place, it opted for what the Founders once called a "standing army" -- a force consisting of long-serving career professionals.

For a time, the creation of this so-called all-volunteer force, only tenuously linked to American society, appeared to be a master stroke. Washington got superbly trained soldiers and Republicans and Democrats took turns putting them to work. The result, once the Cold War ended, was greater willingness to intervene abroad. As Americans followed news reports of U.S. troops going into action everywhere from the Persian Gulf to the Balkans, from the Caribbean to the Horn of Africa, they found little to complain about: The costs appeared negligible. Their role was simply to cheer"

...

"We had been told, on leaving our native soil," wrote the centurion Marcus Flavius to a cousin back in Rome, "that we were going to defend the sacred rights conferred on us by so many of our citizens [and to aid] populations in need of our assistance and our civilization." For such a cause, he and his comrades had willingly offered to "shed our quota of blood, to sacrifice our youth and our hopes." Yet the news from the homeland was disconcerting: The capital was seemingly rife with factions, treachery and petty politics. "Make haste," Marcus Flavius continued, "and tell me that our fellow citizens understand us, support us and protect us as we ourselves are protecting the glory of the empire."

"If it should be otherwise, if we should have to leave our bleached bones on these desert sands in vain, then beware of the anger of the legions!" "

Notes on the "Surge" in Iraq

“The well-known is such because it is well-known, not known.”
- GWF Hegel

Juan Cole, “A Social History of the Surge,” Informed Comment,

http://www.juancole.com/2008/07/social-history-of-surge.html

Cole notes that there is no clear understanding of what the “surge” actually was, as there is a tendency to conflate a policy of buying-off Sunni insurgents with an escalation of US troop levels. For Cole the “surge” means the latter, while the – policy of buying of Sunni insurgents predates the troop escalation.

He also argues that claims that “the surge worked,” depend on “a possible logical fallacy: post hoc ergo propter hoc. If event X comes after event Y, it is natural to suspect that Y caused X. But it would often be a false assumption.”

In his analysis the cause of the decrease in violence in Iraq in the second part of 2007 was a consequence of Shii militias perpetrating a campaign of ethnic cleansing in Baghdad:

“My thesis would be that the US inadvertently allowed the chasing of hundreds of thousands of Sunni Arabs out of Baghdad (and many of them had to go all the way to Syria for refuge). Rates of violence declined once the ethnic cleansing was far advanced, just because there were fewer mixed neighborhoods.”

He also notes that increasing oil revenue (oil prices peaking in July 2008 @ $145), allowed the Malaki government to strengthen it hand vis-à-vis Iraqi society.

“So did the “surge” “work”? The troop escalation in and of itself was probably not that consequential. That the troops were used in new ways by Gen. Petraeus was more important. But their main effect was ironic. They calmed Baghdad down by accidentally turning it into a Shiite city, as Shiite as Isfahan or Tehran, and thus a terrain on which the Sunni Arab guerrilla movement could not hope to fight effectively.”

A timeline of some of the important developments:

- Feb 2006 Askariya (Shi‘i shrine) bombing in Samarra
- Nov 2006 Iraq Study Report
- Jan 2007 Peak of violence in Iraq
- Jan 2007 Oil price low at $50
- Feb 2007 US troop Escalation begins
- Sep 2007 Sadr cease-fire
- July 2008 Oil prices peak at $145

Friday, August 13, 2010

Vietnam and the Willful and Systematic Deception of Public Officials

“You know, they could hang people for what’s in there”

- Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's remark to a friend upon reading the Pentagon Papers in 1971. Quoted in Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 244.

Gee, Bob, who do you suppose they could hang?